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ARGUMENT 
1. DEFENDANT, IN THE COURSE OF MEETING HIS BURDEN OF 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE, HAS SHOWN THAT EVEN WHEN THE 
EVIDENCE IS VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
JURY'S VERDICT, IT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF BURGLARY AS A PARTY. 
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a 
" Md] efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that 
supports the verdict, and then showing that, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient•'" State 
v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Vigil, 
840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 
1993) ) . Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the 
verdict, including all circumstantial evidence, and then persuade the 
appellate court that, based upon this evidence, the State failed to 
prove that he was a party to the burglary of the Kjar residence. See 
State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991). 
In its Brief, the State argues that Defendant failed to 
adequately marshal the evidence (Brief of Appellee, pp. 8-9) . 
However, as is set forth in his Brief (see Brief of Appellant, pp. 
13-19) , Appellant specifically marshals all of the evidence 
supporting the verdict. After doing so, Defendant shows that the 
evidence at trial was woefully short of that required to support a 
reasonable inference that Defendant had either the mental state or 
the required conduct, as set forth by statute, for conviction of 
burglary as a party. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202; Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 17-19. In the course of its argument, the State 
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claims that Defendant omitted five critical facts when marshaling the 
evidence. These facts, rather than supporting the verdict, actually, 
when reviewed more closely, support Defendant's position concerning 
the insufficiency of the evidence.1 
*The State argues that Defendant omitted the five following 
facts: (1) the incorrect address on the pawn cards; (2) that 
Defendant stated that he purchased a guitar from a friend for $5.00, 
which was valued at approximately $250; (3) that Defendant later 
stated that he did not know the guitar had been stolen; (4) that 
Defendant then said that a "friend" had committed the burglary, and 
that he only pawned the items as a favor; and (5) that Defendant 
failed to identify his friend when charged. 
The address contained on the pawn card referred to in fact 
number one is an address that is basically the same address as that 
where Defendant, just a short time before, lived (R. 243-44, Trial 
Transcript). In fact, the address volunteered by Defendant on the 
card is only one number different from the correct address (Id.). 
Defendant mistakenly listed the address as "250 East" instead of "200 
East", where he lived with his brother and sister-in-law for a short 
time (Id.). If Defendant indeed wanted to provide a false address, 
he would not have provided an address so close to his brother's home 
where he previously lived. 
Facts two, three, and four advanced by the State are completely 
consistent with Defendant's position, consistently maintained since 
charges were filed, that a friend had committed the burglary, and 
that he simply pawned the items as a favor (R. 250-51, Trial 
Transcript). In its discussion of fact number four, the State 
confusingly presents Defendant's explanation to his sister-in-law 
about the pawned items elicited by way of her testimony at trial so 
as to advance what it propounds is an inconsistency in Defendant's 
explanation of his knowledge of the burglary. As set forth in his 
sister-in-law's testimony, the telephone conversation between 
Defendant and herself took place approximately one or two months 
prior to trial (R. 250, lines 11-18, Trial Transcript). Because at 
the time of the conversation Defendant knew of the burglary charges 
against him, he simply told his sister-in-law that he "didn't realize 
that the guitar was stolen" when he pawned the items (R. 250-51, 
Trial Transcript). Finally, contrary to the State's argument 
concerning fact number five, simply because Defendant does not reveal 
the identity of his friend to the police, does not create an 
inference that he was a party to the burglary. The aforementioned 
facts, when taken together, emphasize the consistency of Defendant's 
explanation of his possession of the stolen items. 
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Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary, as 
set forth at pages 15-17 of the Brief of Appellant pursuant to the 
marshaling requirement, is viewed is a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, it is insufficient to support Defendant's conviction 
of burglary as a party. The evidence, even when so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. Such a reasonable 
doubt is evidenced by the jury's written communication with the trial 
court during its deliberations. The note from the jury stated, "What 
does %party' mean in regards to when a person became aware of a 
crime? Is a person a "party" to burglary if they are aware of the 
crime after it was committed, or do they have to be aware of it 
before hand? Or during? Help" (R. 86) (emphasis included). 
As set forth in it's Brief, the State's case hinges on the 
inferences to be drawn from Defendant's close proximity to the Kjar 
residence by way of his construction work at the Kjar home around the 
time of the burglary, and that Defendant, shortly after the burglary, 
pawned a portion of the stolen property.2 These events, taken 
together with the other evidence marshaled above, establish no 
probative inference that Defendant, as a party to the burglary, acted 
with the same mental state as the person who entered or remained 
2Cf. State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1986) (holding 
that "[t]he mere possession of stolen property unexplained by the 
person in charge thereof is not in and of itself sufficient to 
justify a conviction of larceny of the property . . . . " ) 
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unlawfully in the residence and solicited, requested, commanded, 
encouraged, or intentionally aided the person in entering or 
unlawfully remaining in the Kjar residence with intent to commit 
theft. "Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or 
supposition; they must be established by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt." See State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993) (noting 
that the State's argument that "speculative inferences can constitute 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is to attack one of the most sacred 
constitutional safeguards at its core"). 
2. BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL'S ACTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
ACTIVE, AS OPPOSED TO A PASSIVE, WAIVER OF AN 
OBJECTION, THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY UNDER PLAIN 
ERROR TO AVOID MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
The State argues that the failure to object to the instruction 
precludes appellate review. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 18-20. By 
so arguing, the State fails to recognize that trial counsel's actions 
did not constitute an active representation that there was no 
objection to clarify the instruction in response to the jury's 
inquiry for clarification. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 
1987) , declined to review a challenge to a jury instruction under the 
manifest or plain error exception. In that case, trial counsel 
"actively represented to the court that she had read the instruction 
and had no objection to it . . ." and thereby "consciously chose not 
to assert any objection that might have been raised and affirmatively 
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led the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong with the 
instruction." Id. at 1023.3 
In State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), the supreme court 
declined to review a challenge under plain error concerning trial 
counsel's failure to seek exclusion of testimony at trial. The basis 
for declining to review the challenge was based upon the conscious 
strategy to challenge the quality rather than the admissibility of 
the State's evidence. Such a consciously chosen strategy was 
evidenced, among other things, by trial counsel's cross-examination 
of the State's witnesses and presentment of countervailing testimony 
of defense experts. Id. at 160. In the course of its ruling, the 
supreme court stated: 
The plain error rule permits the appellate court 
to assure that justice is done, even if counsel 
fails to act to bring a harmfully erroneous 
ruling to the attention of the trial court. But 
if a party through counsel has made a conscious 
decision to refrain from objecting or has led 
the trial court into error, we will then decline 
to save that party from the error. This 
flexibility is inherent in the plain error rule. 
"[T]he plain error . . . test . . . ultimately 
permit[s] the appellate court to balance the 
need for procedural regularity with the demands 
of fairness." 
Id. at 158 (quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989)). 
In the instant case, trial counsel, prior to the jury's 
35ee also State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 1995), 
where this Court declined to review a jury instruction challenge 
under the manifest injustice exception because trial counsel agreed 
that the instruction was a correct statement of the law and did not 
specifically object to the instruction, but merely offered an 
alternative. 
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deliberations, did not object to the instructions utilized to 
instruct the jury about the requirements of convicting Defendant as 
a party to burglary. Further, during the in-chambers conference 
concerning the note received from the jury, in which Defendant was 
not present, trial counsel merely said "alright" when the trial court 
confusingly suggested that the jury be referred to Jury Instruction 
No. 22, the same instruction with which they had been previously 
instructed.4 This is the same instruction given to the jury prior to 
its deliberations and its note5 to the trial court, which was sent 
shortly after deliberations began, in which the jury sought guidance 
from the court as to what is required in terms of a person's 
awareness to be guilty of burglary as a party. The jury's note 
evidences the doubts entertained by the jury about imposing criminal 
liability as a party in the instant case where the evidence 
consistently shows, at the very most, that Defendant was not aware of 
4In the course of the in-chambers conference with counsel, the 
trial court initially recognized the instructions as inadequate to 
answer the jury's question (R. 349, line 3, Trial Transcript). The 
trial court then merely referred the jury to the previously utilized 
Jury Instruction No. 22, which states: "You are instructed that in 
every crime or public offense, there must be a union or joint 
operation of the act or intent (R. 86-87) . As support for the trial 
court's use of the language in Jury Instruction No. 22, the State 
cites State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982) . Maestas, however, 
had absolutely nothing to do with party liability for the conduct of 
another. 
5Shortly after the jury began its deliberations, the trial court 
received the following note from the jury: "What does "party" mean 
in regards to when a person became aware of a crime? Is a person a 
"party" to burglary if they are aware of the crime after it was 
committed, or do they have to be aware of it before hand [sic]? Or 
during? Help" (R. 86) (emphasis included). 
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the burglary until after the burglary had been committed. Such 
evidence is not enough to impose criminal liability as a party under 
§ 76-2-202. By failing to instruct the jury that one cannot be 
convicted as a party of burglary if that person is not aware of the 
conduct that constitutes the burglary until after it is committed, 
the trial court breached its duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 
1981)). The trial court's failure is especially troubling when 
considered in light of the trial court's own acknowledgment that the 
instructions were inadequate to answer the jury's question and the 
trial court's confusion about party liability under Utah law as 
evidenced by the in-chambers conference (See R. 348-50, Trial 
Transcript). 
The instant case, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, 
is particularly compelling for applying the plain or manifest 
injustice doctrine. Such circumstances not only warrant review by 
way of the plain error or manifest injustice doctrine but they also 
warrant reversal of Defendant's conviction of burglary as a party. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse Defendant's conviction of burglary and remand the case 
for a new trial with instructions to correct the errors committed in 
the course of his trial. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
issues in the instant appeal dealing with principles concerning 
sufficiency of evidence, circumstantial evidence, and what is 
required for conviction as a party to a crime, which are matters of 
continuing public interest and which involve issues requiring further 
development in the area of criminal law case development. Counsel 
for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition of the 
instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official 
Publication" for purposes of precedential value and instruction in 
future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 1997. 
>LD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
rL Wigquns 
Defendant§~cor Defendant 
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